NoPAC Check
Tests each discovered Domain Controller for the NoPAC vulnerability chain
(CVE-2021-42278
and
CVE-2021-42287)
by comparing PAC and non-PAC TGT responses.
Prerequisite
Requires a valid Standard User account (authenticated).
Commands run
ad-kit runs NetExec against each Domain Controller:
What it checks
ad-kit compares the size of a TGT returned with a Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC) against one returned without it. A "without PAC" TGT smaller than the "with PAC" TGT indicates the controller is vulnerable.
How it works
NoPAC chains two issues:
CVE-2021-42278issAMAccountNamespoofing: an account can be renamed to match a Domain Controller (minus the trailing$).CVE-2021-42287is a KDC lookup flaw: requesting a service ticket for a nonexistent account causes the KDC to append$and resolve the matching machine account, mis-associating the ticket.
The PAC carries the user's security information (SID, groups, rights). A
controller that returns a TGT without a PAC can be induced to issue tickets
that bypass normal PAC validation, enabling the S4U2Self flow to impersonate
a privileged user such as Administrator.
Why it matters
A vulnerable controller can be abused to escalate a standard domain account up
to Domain Administrator. NoPAC and sAMAccountName spoofing are independent
conditions: a controller may be NoPAC-vulnerable while still blocking the
rename (for example with ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota set to zero). Patching is
the only complete fix.
Findings
| Finding ID | Title |
|---|---|
| NOPAC-001 | NoPAC Vulnerability Detected |