AS-REP Roasting Check
Identifies user accounts configured without Kerberos pre-authentication. Such accounts are susceptible to AS-REP roasting, which allows an unauthenticated attacker to request encrypted material that can be cracked offline to recover the account password.
Prerequisite
Requires the filtered domain user list produced by ad-kit enum.
Commands run
ad-kit runs Impacket's
GetNPUsers.py
in unauthenticated mode against the filtered domain user list:
GetNPUsers.py <domain>/ -dc-ip <dc_ip> -format hashcat -outputfile <outfile> -usersfile <users_file> -no-pass
What it checks
ad-kit scans the domain user list for accounts with the
UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH
flag set (the "Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication" option), extracts the
affected account names from the returned AS-REP hashes, and, when a Standard
User password is available, checks whether any affected account belongs to a
monitored privileged group.
How it works
Kerberos pre-authentication normally requires a client to prove knowledge of the account password before the Key Distribution Centre (KDC) issues a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT). The client encrypts a timestamp with a key derived from the password and sends it with the authentication request (AS-REQ). If the KDC can decrypt and validate the timestamp, it knows the client holds the password.
When "Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication" is enabled, the KDC skips this step. Any client with network access to the KDC can then request an AS-REP for that account, and the response contains material encrypted with a key derived from the account password. The attacker cracks this offline.
The requested AS-REP contains two parts:
- A Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT), encrypted with the KDC's secret key.
- A session key, encrypted with the account's secret. This is the part AS-REP roasting targets.
Accounts usually end up roastable because a legacy or third-party application
required pre-authentication to be disabled. An attacker with
GenericAll
or
GenericWrite
over an account can also set the flag deliberately, which is known as targeted
AS-REP roasting. ad-kit identifies the resulting roastable accounts but does
not currently enumerate those write rights.
AS-REP via ARP spoofing
There is also a network-level variant that captures AS-REP material for accounts that authenticate normally, without any directory modification.
When a user signs in to a domain-joined workstation, the client sends an AS-REQ and the DC responds with an AS-REP. On a local network, the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) maps IP addresses to MAC addresses and provides no authentication. An attacker on the same VLAN can send forged ARP responses to impersonate the client or the DC, placing themselves between the two and intercepting Kerberos traffic (TCP/88).
ASRepCatcher automates this and offers two modes:
- Relay mode: intercepts AS-REQ messages and forwards them to the DC, attempting to force RC4 where supported to simplify cracking.
- Listen mode: poisons the gateway's ARP cache to capture AS-REP responses passively.
Not checked by ad-kit
ad-kit does not perform ARP spoofing or capture AS-REP traffic. This section is provided for reference.
Why it matters
AS-REP roasting provides an unauthenticated route to password material. If a weak or guessable password is recovered, the attacker gains a valid domain credential that can be used for further access. Impact is greatest when the affected account also holds privileged group membership (see ASREP-002).
Findings
| Finding ID | Title |
|---|---|
| ASREP-001 | Accounts Susceptible to AS-REP Roasting |
| ASREP-002 | Privileged Accounts Susceptible to AS-REP Roasting |
Tooling
GetNPUsers.py(Impacket): used by this check.- NetExec:
nxc ldap <dc> -u users.txt -p '' --asreproast <outfile>. - Rubeus:
Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat. - Kerbrute: user enumeration.
- hashcat:
hashcat -m 18200. - John the Ripper:
john --format=krb5asrep.